





















































































































Economists have long been concerned with the problem of how to estimate the eect of a
treatment on some outcome of interest, possibly after conditioning on a vector of covariates.
The main empirical challenge in studies of this type arises from the fact that selection for
treatment is usually related to the potential outcomes that individuals would attain with
and without the treatment. Therefore, systematic dierences in the distribution of the
outcome variable between treated and nontreated may reect not only the causal eect of
the treatment, but also dierences generated by the selection process.
A variety of methods have been proposed to overcome the selection problem (see Heck-
man and Robb (1985) for a review). The traditional approach relies on structural models
which use distributional assumptions and functional form restrictions to identify causal
parameters. Unfortunately, estimators based on parametric assumptions can be seriously
biased by modest departures from the assumptions (Goldberger (1983)). In addition, a
number of researchers have noted that strong parametric assumptions are not necessary
to identify causal parameters of interest (see e.g., Heckman (1990), Imbens and Angrist
(1994), and Manski (1997)). Consequently, it is desirable to develop robust estimators of
treatment eects based on nonparametric or semiparametric identication procedures.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper introduces a new class of instrumental
variable (IV) estimators of causal treatment eects for linear and nonlinear models with
covariates. Identication is attained through weak nonparametric assumptions. Unlike
traditional approaches, which presume a correctly specied parametric model, and more
recent nonparametric estimators, which are often dicult to interpret and to use for extrap-
olation, the methodology outlined here allows the use of simple parametric specications to
produce well-dened approximations to a causal response function of interest. Moreover,
an important feature of the approach outlined here is that identication does not depend
on the parametric specication being chosen correctly. On the other hand, if required,
functional form restrictions and distributional assumptions can also be accommodated in
the analysis. As in the IV model of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens and
1Rubin (1996), identication comes from a binary instrument that induces exogenous selec-
tion into treatment for some subset of the population. In contrast with earlier work on IV
treatment-eects models, however, the approach taken here easily accommodates covariates
and can be used to estimate nonlinear models with a binary endogenous regressor.
The ability to control for covariates is important because most instruments in economics
require conditioning on a set of covariates to be valid. Covariates can also be used to
reect observable dierences in the composition of populations, making extrapolation more
credible. Another feature of the approach taken here, the ability to estimate nonlinear
models, is important because in some cases, such as evaluation problems with limited
dependent variables, the underlying causal response function is inherently nonlinear. As
a by-product of the general framework introduced here, I develop an IV estimator that
provides the best linear approximation to an underlying causal relationship of interest, just
as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) provides the best linear approximation to a conditional
expectation. It is shown that Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimators typically do not
have this property and the causal interpretation of 2SLS coecients is briey studied.
Previous eorts to introduce covariates in the IV treatment-eects framework include
Little and Yau (1998), Hirano et al. (1999) and Angrist and Imbens (1995). Little and
Yau (1998) and Hirano et al. (1999) use distributional assumptions and functional form re-
strictions to accommodate covariates in the IV treatment-eects analysis. The approach in
Angrist and Imbens (1995) is only valid for fully saturated specications involving discrete
covariates. In contrast, the identication procedure introduced here requires no parametric
assumptions, while allowing the estimation of parsimonious approximations to the causal
response of interest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic IV approach
to treatment eects, introducing the concepts and notation used throughout. Section 3
presents the main identication theorem. Section 4 uses the results from the previous
section to develop estimators of causal response functions. Asymptotic distribution theory
is also provided. The causal interpretation of linear models with covariates is outlined in
2Section 5. Section 6 applies the approach introduced in this paper to estimate the eects of
401(k) programs on savings, a question originally explored in a series of papers by Engen,
Gale and Scholz (1994, 1996) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1994, 1995, 1996) among others.
Section 7 summarizes and suggests directions for future research. Proofs are provided in
the appendix.
2. The IV Treatment-Effects Framework
2.1. The Identification Problem
Suppose that we are interested in the eect of some treatment, say college graduation, which
is represented by the binary variable D, on some outcome Y of interest, say earnings. Like
in Rubin (1974, 1977), we dene Y1 and Y0 as the potential outcomes that an individual
would attain with and without being exposed to the treatment.
In the example, Y1 represents potential earnings as a college graduate while Y0 represents
potential earnings as a non-graduate. The causal eect of college graduation on earnings
is then naturally dened as Y1   Y0. Now, an identication problem arises from the fact
that we cannot observe both potential outcomes Y1 and Y0 for the same individual, we only
observe Y = Y1 D+Y0 (1 D). Since one of the potential outcomes is always missing we
cannot compute the causal treatment eect, Y1 Y0, for any individual. We could still hope
to estimate the average treatment eect E[Y1   Y0], or the average eect on the treated
E[Y1   Y0jD = 1]. However, comparisons of earnings for treated and non-treated do not
usually give the right answer:
E[Y jD = 1]   E[Y jD = 0] = E[Y1jD = 1]   E[Y0jD = 0]
= E[Y1   Y0jD = 1]
+ fE[Y0jD = 1]   E[Y0jD = 0]g:
(1)
The rst term of the right hand side of equation (1) gives the average eect of the treatment
on the treated. The second term represents the bias caused by endogenous selection in
the treatment. In general, this bias is dierent from zero because anticipated potential
outcomes usually aect selection in the treatment.
3Identication of a meaningful average causal eect is a dicult task when there is
endogenous selection in the treatment. The classical models of causal inference are based
on explicit randomization (Fisher (1935), Neyman (1923)). Randomization of the treatment
guarantees that D is independent of the potential outcomes, so the bias term in equation
(1) vanishes. However, independence between treatment and potential outcomes is not
likely to hold in most economic applications, where selection for treatment is not random.
In some cases, independence between treatment and potential outcomes is plausible once
we condition on a vector of observed covariates X; this situation is called selection on
observables. In our example, selection on observables would hold if, once we control for
socio-economic variables such as race, gender or family income, college graduation was
independent of potential earnings.
In many relevant settings, economists think that observed variables cannot explain all
the dependence between treatment selection and potential outcomes (see, e.g., Heckman
and Robb (1985)). In the schooling example, unobserved ability may aect both academic
and professional success, biasing the estimates of the eect of schooling on earnings even
after controlling for observed characteristics, like family background variables. One possible
solution to this problem is to use structural equation methods. Structural models impose
parametric restrictions on the stochastic relations between variables, both observable and
unobservable. In imposing those restrictions, the analyst is often helped by some formal
or informal economic argument. In practice, the restrictions imposed by structural models
are usually stronger than those suggested by economic theory, so some concern about
misspecication exists.
When the analyst has an instrument that induces exogenous selection in the treatment,
IV models provide an alternative identication strategy that does not use parametric re-
strictions.
2.2. Identification by Instrumental Variables
Suppose that there is a possible binary instrument Z available to the researcher. The
formal requisites for an instrument to be valid are stated below. Informally speaking, the
4role of an instrument is to induce exogenous variation in the treatment variable. The IV
model of Imbens and Angrist (1994) recognizes the dependence between the treatment and
the instrument by using potential treatment indicators. The binary variable Dz represents
potential treatment status given Z = z. Suppose, for example, that Z is an indicator of
college proximity (see Card (1993)). Then D0 = 0 and D1 = 1 for a particular individual
means that such individual would graduate from college if living nearby a college at the end
of high school, but would not graduate otherwise. The treatment status indicator variable
can then be expressed as D = Z D1 +(1 Z)D0. In practice, we observe Z and D (and
therefore Dz for individuals with Z = z), but we do not observe both potential treatment
indicators. Following the terminology of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), the population
is divided in groups dened by the contingent treatment indicators D1 and D0. Compliers
are those individuals who have D1 > D0 (or equivalently, D0 = 0 and D1 = 1). In the
same fashion, always-takers are dened by D1 = D0 = 1 and never-takers by D1 = D0 = 0.
Finally, deers are dened by D1 < D0 (or D0 = 1 and D1 = 0). Notice that, since only
one of the potential treatment indicators (D0;D1) is observed, we cannot identify which
one of these four groups any particular individual belongs to.
In order to state the properties that a valid instrument should have, we need to include
Z in the denition of potential outcomes. For a particular individual, the variable Yzd
represents the potential outcome that this individual would obtain if Z = z and D = d.
In the schooling example, Y01 represents the potential earnings that some individual would
obtain if not living near a college at the end of high school but being college graduate.
Clearly, if D0 = 0 for some individual, we will not be able to observe Y01 for such individual.
The following identifying assumption is used in most of the paper; it states a set of
nonparametric conditions under which instrumental variables techniques can be used to
identify meaningful causal parameters. As before, X represents a vector of predetermined
variables.
Assumption 2.1:
(i) Independence of the Instrument : Conditional on X, the random vector (Y00;Y01;Y10;Y11;
5D0;D1) is independent of Z.
(ii) Exclusion of the Instrument : P(Y1d = Y0djX) = 1 for d 2 f0;1g.
(iii) First Stage : 0 < P(Z = 1jX) < 1 and P(D1 = 1jX) > P(D0 = 1jX).
(iv) Monotonicity : P(D1  D0jX) = 1.
This assumption is essentially the conditional version of those used in Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin (1996). Assumption 2.1(i) is also called ignorability and it means that Z is \as
good as randomly assigned" once we condition on X. Assumption 2.1(i) implies:
P(Z = 1jY00;Y01;Y10;Y11;D0;D1;X) = P(Z = 1jX);
which, in absence of covariates, is the exact meaning of the expression \as good as randomly
assigned" in this paper. Assumption 2.1(ii) means that variation in the instrument does
not change potential outcomes other than through D. This assumption allows us to dene
potential outcomes in terms of D alone so we have Y0 = Y00 = Y10 and Y1 = Y01 = Y11.
Together, assumptions 2.1(i) and 2.1(ii) guarantee that the only eect of the instrument
on the outcome is through variation in treatment status. Assumption 2.1(iii) is related to
the rst stage, it guarantees that Z and D are correlated conditional on X. In addition,
Assumption 2.1(iii) implies that the support of X conditional on Z = 1 coincides with
the support of X conditional on Z = 0. Assumption 2.1(iv) rules out the existence of
deers and denes a partition of the population into always-takers, compliers, and never-
takers. Monotonicity is usually easy to assess from the institutional knowledge of the
problem. Monotonicity, in this conditional form, is implied by the assumption: D1  D0.
For the schooling example this simpler version of the monotonicity assumption means that
those who would graduate from college if not living nearby a college would also graduate
from college if living nearby one, holding everything else equal. In this setting, a possible
instrument, Z, is said to be valid if Assumption 2.1 holds. In what follows, it is enough
that Assumption 2.1 holds almost surely with respect to the probability law of X.
The previous literature on treatment eects in IV models uses an unconditional version
of Assumption 2.1. The main result of this literature is stated in the following theorem
6due to Imbens and Angrist (1994):
Theorem 2.1: If Assumption 2.1 holds in absence of covariates, then a simple IV estimand





E[Y jZ = 1]   E[Y jZ = 0]
E[DjZ = 1]   E[DjZ = 0]
= E[Y1   Y0jD1 > D0]: (2)
This theorem says that the average treatment eect is identied for compliers. More-
over, it has been shown that, under the same assumptions, the entire marginal distributions
of potential outcomes are identied for compliers (see Imbens and Rubin (1997) and Abadie
(1997)). Although Theorem 2.1 does not incorporate covariates, it can easily be extended
in that direction. Note that under Assumption 2.1, the result of Theorem 2.1 must hold
for all X:
E[Y1   Y0jX;D1 > D0] =
E[Y jX;Z = 1]   E[Y jX;Z = 0]
E[DjX;Z = 1]   E[DjX;Z = 0]
: (3)
In principle, we can use equation (3) to estimate E[Y1   Y0jX = x;D1 > D0] for all x in
the support of X. If X is discrete and nite, it is straightforward to compute the sample
counterpart of the right hand side of equation (3) for X = x. If X is continuous, the estima-
tion process can be based on nonparametric smoothing techniques. The main advantage of
this strategy resides in the exibility of functional form. However, nonparametric methods
have disadvantages related to the interpretation of the results and the precision of the es-
timators.1 Futhermore, nonparametric methods are not suitable for extrapolation outside
the observed support of the covariates. Parametric methods based on structural models
do not have these drawbacks but their validity rests on strong assumptions. This paper
proposes a semiparametric strategy that shares many of the virtues of both parametric and
nonparametric models and avoids some of their disadvantages.2
1For fully nonparametric estimators, the number of observations required to attain an acceptable preci-
sion increases very rapidly with the number of covariates. This problem is called the curse of dimensionality
and makes precision of nonparametric estimators be typically low.
2Stoker (1992) and Powell (1994) review semiparametric estimation and discuss its advantages over fully
parametric or nonparametric methods.
73. Identification of Statistical Characteristics for Compliers
This section presents an identication theorem that includes previous results on causal IV
models as special cases, and provides the basis for new identication results. To study
identication we proceed as if we knew the joint distribution of (Y;D;X;Z). In practice,
we can use a random sample from (Y;D;X;Z) to construct estimators based on sample
analogs of the population results.
Lemma 3.1: Under Assumption 2.1,
P(D1 > D0jX) = E[DjZ = 1;X]   E[DjZ = 0;X] > 0:
This lemma says that, under Assumption 2.1, the proportion of compliers in the population
is identied given X and this proportion is greater than zero. This preliminary result is
important for establishing the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1: Let g() be any measurable real function of (Y;D;X) such that Ejg(Y;D;X)j
< 1. Dene
(0) = (1   D) 
(1   Z)   P(Z = 0jX)
P(Z = 0jX)P(Z = 1jX)
;
(1) = D 
Z   P(Z = 1jX)
P(Z = 0jX)P(Z = 1jX)
;
 = (0)  P(Z = 0jX) + (1)  P(Z = 1jX) = 1  
D  (1   Z)
P(Z = 0jX)
 


















Moreover, a., b., and c. also hold conditional on X.
Note that setting g(Y;D;X) = 1 we obtain E[] = P(D1 > D0), so we can think about
 as a weighting scheme that allows us to identify expectations for compliers. However, 
does not produce proper weights since when D diers from Z,  takes negative values.
Theorem 3.1 is a powerful identication result; it says that any statistical characteristic
that can be dened in terms of moments of the joint distribution of (Y;D;X) is identied
for compliers. Since D is exogenous given X for compliers, Theorem 3.1 can be used to
identify meaningful causal parameters for this group of the population. The next section
applies Theorem 3.1 to the estimation of average causal response functions for compliers.
4. Estimation of Average Causal Response Functions
4.1. Complier Causal Response Functions
Consider the conditional expectation function E[Y jX;D;D1 > D0]. Since D  Z for
compliers and Z is ignorable given X, it follows that
E[Y jX;D = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y0jX;Z = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y0jX;D1 > D0];
and
E[Y jX;D = 1;D1 > D0] = E[Y1jX;Z = 1;D1 > D0] = E[Y1jX;D1 > D0]:
Therefore,
E[Y jX;D = 1;D1 > D0]   E[Y jX;D = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y1   Y0jX;D1 > D0];
so E[Y jX;D;D1 > D0] describes a causal relationship for any group of compliers dened
by some value for the covariates. In what follows, I refer to E[Y jX;D;D1 > D0] as the
Complier Causal Response Function (CCRF).3
3The average response is not necessarily the only causal function of interest. Abadie, Angrist and
Imbens (1998) apply Theorem 3.1 to the estimation of quantile response functions for compliers.
9An important special case arises when P(D0 = 0jX) = 1. This happens, for example,
in randomized experiments when there is perfect exclusion of the control group from the
treatment. In such cases,
E[Y jX;D = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y0jX;Z = 0;D1 = 1]
= E[Y0jX;Z = 1;D1 = 1] = E[Y0jX;D = 1]
and similarly E[Y jX;D = 1;D1 > D0] = E[Y1jX;D = 1], so the CCRF describes the eect
of the treatment for the treated given X. Note also that when P(D0 = 0jX) = 1 or, more
generally, when P(D0 = 0 [ D1 = 1jX) = 1, then monotonicity holds trivially.
The fact that the conditional expectation of Y given D and X for compliers has a
causal interpretation would not be very useful in the absence of Theorem 3.1. Since only
one of the potential treatment status, (D0;D1), is observed, compliers are not individually
identied. Therefore, the CCRF cannot be estimated directly because we cannot construct
a sample of compliers. Theorem 3.1 provides a solution to this identication problem by
expressing expectations for compliers in terms of expectations for the whole population.
4.2. Estimation
This section describes two ways to learn about the CCRF: (i) approximate the CCRF
within some class of parametric functions by Least Squares (LS), (ii) specify a paramet-
ric distribution for P(Y jX;D;D1 > D0) and estimate the parameters of the CCRF by
Maximum Likelihood (ML). Throughout, W = (Y;D;X;Z) and fwign
i=1 is a sample of
realizations of W.
4.2.1. Least Squares
Consider some class of parametric functions H = fh(D;X;) :  2   Rmg in the
Lebesgue space of square-integrable functions.4 The best L2 approximation from H to
4To avoid existence problems, H can be restricted such that  7! h(;;) is a continuous mapping on
 compact.
10E[Y jX;D;D1 > D0] is given by h(D;X;0) where
0 = argmin2 E

fE [Y jD;X;D1 > D0]   h(D;X;)g





2 jD1 > D0

:
Since we do not observe both D0 and D1 the equation above cannot be directly applied to
the estimation of 0. However, by Theorem 3.1 we have
0 = argmin2 E

  (Y   h(D;X;))
2
: (4)
For expositional purposes, suppose that we know the function 0(x) = P(Z = 1jX = x).
Then, we can construct fign
i=1 and apply equation (4) to estimate 0. The study of the
more empirically relevant case in which the function 0() has to be estimated in a rst
step is postponed until section 4.3. Following the Analogy Principle (see Manski (1988)),
a natural estimator of 0 is given by the sample counterpart of equation (4):





i  (yi   h(di;xi;))
2;
where i = 1   di(1   zi)=(1   0(xi))   (1   di)zi=0(xi).
For example, suppose that we want to approximate the CCRF using a linear function.
In this case h(D;X;) = D + X0 and  = (;). The parameters of the best linear
approximation to the CCRF are dened as
(0;0) = argmin (;)2 E
h




 D1 > D0
i
: (5)
Theorem 3.1 and the Analogy Principle lead to the the following estimator:









Linear specications are very popular because they summarize the eect of each covariate on
the outcome in a single parameter. However, in many situations we are actually interested
in how the eect of the treatment varies with the covariates. Also, when the dependent
variable is limited, nonlinear response functions may provide a more accurate description
of the CCRF.
11Probit transformations of linear functions are often used when the dependent variable
is binary. In such case, the objects of interest are conditional probabilities and the Probit
function restricts the approximation to lie in between zero and one. Another appealing
feature of the Probit specication is that the estimated eect of the treatment is allowed
to change with covariates. As usual, let () be the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal. The best L2 approximation to the CCRF using a Probit function is given
by:
(0;0) = argmin(;)2 E
h







Again, Theorem 3.1, along with the Analogy Principle, suggests the following estimator for
0 = (0;0):









Note that no parametric assumptions are used for Least Squares approximation. However,
if E[Y jD;X;D1 > D0] = h(D;X;0) for some 0 2 , then Least Squares identies 0.
More generally, the methodology developed in this paper can be used to estimate nonlinear
models with endogenous binary regressors without making distributional assumptions.
4.2.2. Maximum Likelihood
In some cases, the researcher may be willing to specify a parametric distribution for
P(Y jX;D;D1 > D0) (with density f(Y;D;X;0) for 0 2  and expectation E[Y jD;X;
D1 > D0] = h(D;X;0)), and estimate 0 by ML. Under this kind of distributional as-
sumption we have
0 = argmax2 E [lnf(Y;D;X;)jD1 > D0]: (8)
As before, in order to express the problem in equation (8) in terms of moments for the
whole population we apply Theorem 3.1 to get
0 = argmax2 E [  lnf(Y;D;X;)]:
12An analog estimator for the last equation exploits the ML principle after weighting with
i:






Following with the Probit example of Section 4.2.1, suppose that we consider E[Y jD;X;
D1 > D0] = (0D + X00). Since Y is binary, E[Y jD;X;D1 > D0] provides a complete
specication of the conditional distribution P(Y jD;X;D1 > D0). Under this assumption,
for  containing (0;0), we have
(0;0) = argmax(;)2 E [Y  ln(D + X
0) + (1   Y )  ln( D   X
0)jD1 > D0]
= argmax(;)2 E [  fY  ln(D + X
0) + (1   Y )  ln( D   X
0)g]:
Therefore, an analog estimator of (0;0) is given by





i  (yi  ln(di + x
0
i) + (1   yi)  ln( di   x
0
i)): (9)
Between the nonparametric approach adopted for LS approximation and the distribu-
tional assumptions needed for ML, there is a broad range of models that impose dierent
restrictions on P(Y jD;X;D1 > D0). Mean independence and symmetry are examples of
possible restrictions that allow identication of interesting features of P(Y jD;X;D1 > D0).
For the sake of brevity, these kinds of models are not explicitly considered in this paper.
However, the basic framework of identication and estimation presented here also applies
to them. Note also that although this section (and the rest of the paper) only exploits part
a. of Theorem 3.1, parts b. and c. of Theorem 3.1 can also be used in a similar way to
identify and estimate causal treatment eects.
4.3. Distribution Theory
For any measurable real function q(;), let q() = q(W;) and qi() = q(wi;) where 
represents a (possibly innite-dimensional) parameter. Also, k  k denotes the Euclidean
norm. The next assumption is the usual identication condition invoked for extremum
estimators.
13Assumption 4.1: The expectation E[g()jD1 > D0] has a unique minimum at 0 over  2
.
The specic form of g() depends on the model and the identication strategy, and it
will be left unrestricted except for regularity conditions. For LS, the function g() is a
quadratic loss, for ML it is minus the logarithm of a density for W.
If we know the nuisance parameter 0, then  is observable and the estimation of 0 is
carried out in a single step:





i(0)  gi(): (10)
The asymptotic distribution for such an estimator can be easily derived from the standard
asymptotic theory for extremum estimators (see e.g., Newey and McFadden (1994)).
If 0 is unknown, which is often the case, we can estimate 0 in a rst step and then
plug the estimates of 0(xi) in equation (10) to solve for b  in a second step. If 0 has
a known parametric form (or if the researcher is willing to assume one), 0 can be esti-
mated using conventional parametric methods. If the form of 0 is unrestricted (except for
regularity conditions), we can construct a semiparametric two-step estimator that uses a
nonparametric rst step estimator of 0. Asymptotic theory for b  in each case is provided
below. Section 4.3.1 focuses on the parametric case, when 0 = (X;0) for some known
function  and 0 2 Rl. Section 4.3.2 derives the asymptotic distribution for b  when 0 is
estimated nonparametrically in a rst step using power series. One advantage of rst step
series estimation over kernel methods is that undersmoothing is not necessary to achieve
p
n-consistency for b . This is important because the estimate of 0 can sometimes be an
interesting by-product of the estimation process.
4.3.1. Parametric First Step
This section studies two-step estimation procedures for 0 that are based on equation (10)
and that use a parametric estimator in the rst step.5 First, we establish the consistency
5Note that in some cases we may know a parametric form for 0. The main example is when X is
discrete with nite support. Then, 0 is linear in a saturated model that includes indicators for all possible
14of such estimators.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1 hold and that (i) the data are i.i.d.;
(ii)  is compact; (iii) 0() belongs to some (known) parametric class of functions (;)
such that for some 0 2 Rl, 0(X) = (X;0); there exists  > 0 such that for k 0k < ,
(X;) is bounded away from zero and one and is continuous at each  on the support of
X; (iv) b 
p
! 0; (v) g() is continuous at each  2  with probability one; there exists
b(W) such that kg()k  b(W) for all  2  and E[b(W)] < 1. Then b 
p
! 0.
We say that an estimator b ' of some parameter '0 is asymptotically linear with inuence
function  (W) when
p






 (wi) + op(1); and E[ (W)] = 0; E[k (W)k
2] < 1:
Next theorem provides sucient conditions for asymptotic normality of b  when the rst
step estimator of 0 is asymptotically linear. This requirement is very weak because most
estimators used in econometrics fall in this class.
Theorem 4.2: If the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 hold and (i) 0 2 interior(); (ii) there
exist  > 0 and b(W) such that for k 0k < , g() is twice continuously dierentiable and
E[sup:k 0k<k@2g()=@@0k] < 1, and for k 0k < , (X;) is continuously dieren-
tiable at each , k@(X;)=@k  b(W) and E[b(W)2] < 1; (iii) b  is asymptotically linear
with inuence function  (W); (iv) E[k@g(0)=@k2] < 1 and M = E[(@2g(0)=@@0)]
is non-singular. Then,
p
n(b    0)


















and M = E[(@g(0)=@)  (@(0)=@0)].
In order to make inference operational, we need a consistent estimator of the asymptotic
variance matrix V . Consider,











+ c M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values of X. For other cases, nonlinear models such as Probit or Logit can be used in the rst step to
guarantee that the estimate of 0 lies in between zero and one.
15where c M and c M are the sample analogs of M and M evaluated at the estimates.
Typically, b   is also some some sample counterpart of   where 0 has been substituted by
b .
Theorem 4.3: If the conditions of Theorem 4.2 hold and (i) there is b(W) such that for
 close enough to 0, k()@g()=@   (0)@g(0)=@k  b(W)(k   0k + k   0k) and
E[b(W)2] < 1; (ii) n 1 Pn
i=1 kb  i    ik2 p
! 0, then b V
p
! V .
4.3.2. Semiparametric Estimation using Power Series
First step parametric estimation procedures are easy to implement. However, consistency of
b  depends on the correct specication of the rst step. Therefore, nonparametric procedures
in the rst step are often advisable when we have little knowledge about the functional
form of 0.
This section considers two-step estimators of 0 that use power series in a rst step to
estimate 0. The main advantage of this type of semiparametric estimators over those which
use kernel methods is that undersmoothing in the rst step may not be necessary to attain
p
n-consistency of b  (see e.g., Newey and McFadden (1994)). Other advantages of series
estimation are that it easily accommodates dimension-reducing nonparametric restrictions
to 0 (as e.g., additive separability) and that it requires low computational eort. The
motivation for focusing on a particular type of approximating functions (power series) is
to provide primitive regularity conditions. For brevity, other types of approximating series
such as splines are not considered here but the results can be easily generalized to include
them.
Theory for semiparametric estimators that use rst step series has been developed in
Andrews (1991) and Newey (1994a, 1994b) among others. This section applies results
from Newey (1994b) to derive regularity conditions for semiparametric estimators of causal
response functions.
Let  = (1;:::;r)0 be a vector of non-negative integers where r is the dimension of X.6
6If 0 depend only on a subset of the covariates considered in the CCRF, then r is the number of
covariates that enter 0.




j and jj =
Pr
j=1 j. For a sequence f(k)g1
k=1 with jj increasing
and a positive integer K, let pK(X) = (p1K(X);:::;pKK(X))0 where pkK(X) = X(k). Then,
for K = K(n) ! 1 a power series nonparametric estimator of 0 is given by
b (X) = p
K(X)
0 b  (11)




i=1 pK(xi)zi) and A  denotes any symmetric gener-
alized inverse of A.
The next three theorems present results on the asymptotic distribution of b  when equa-
tion (11) is used in a rst step to estimate 0.7
Theorem 4.4: If Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1 hold and (i) the data are i.i.d.; (ii)  is compact;
(iii) X is continuously distributed with support equal to a Cartesian product of compact
intervals and density bounded away from zero on its support; (iv) 0(X) is bounded away
from zero and one and is continuously dierentiable of order s; (v) g() is continuous at
each  2  with probability one; (vi) there is b(W) such that for  2 , kg()k  b(W),
E[b(W)] < 1 and K  [(K=n)1=2 + K s=r] ! 0. Then b 
p
! 0.
Let (X) = E[(@g(0)=@)  jX] where  = @(0(X))=@ = Z(1   D)=(0(X))2  
D(1   Z)=(1   0(X))2. The function (X) is used in the following theorem that provides
sucient conditions for asymptotic normality of b .
Theorem 4.5: Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.4 and (i) 0 2 interior(); (ii)
there is  > 0 such that for k   0k < , g() is twice continuously dierentiable and
E[sup:k 0k<k@2g()=@@0k] < 1; (iii)
p
nK2[(K=n) + K 2s=r] ! 0 and for each K
there is K such that nE[k(X)   KpK(X)k2]K 2s=r ! 0; (iv) E[k@g(0)=@k2] < 1 and
M = E[  (@2g(0)=@@0)] is non singular. Then,
p
n(b    0)


















7Typically we may want to trim the tted values from equation (11) so that b  lies between zero and one.
All the results in this section still apply when the trimming function converges uniformly to the identity
in the open interval between zero and one.
17The second part of condition (iii) in last theorem deserves some comment. To minimize
the mean square error in the rst step we need that K 2s=r goes to zero at the same rate
as K=n. This means that, as long as (X) is smooth enough, undersmoothing in the rst
step is not necessary to achieve
p
n-consistency in the second step. Therefore, when (X)
is smooth enough, cross-validation techniques can be used to select K for the rst step.
This feature is not shared by semiparametric estimators that use kernel regression in a rst
step; those estimators usually require some undersmoothing.
An estimator of V can be constructed by using the sample counterparts of its compo-
nents evaluated at the estimates:





















where c M = n 1 Pn
i=1 i(b )  (@2gi(b )=@@0). Following the ideas in Newey (1994b), an
estimator of (X) can be constructed by projecting f(@gi(b )=@)  i(b )gn






















The next theorem provides sucient conditions for consistency of b V constructed as above.
Theorem 4.6: If the assumptions of Theorem 4.5 hold and there is  > 0 such that
E[sup:k 0k<k@2g()=@@0k2] < 1, then b V
p
! V .
Institutional knowledge about the nature of the instrument can often be used to restrict
the number of covariates from X that enter the function 0. This dimension reduction can
be very important to overcome the curse of dimensionality when X is highly dimensional.
For example, in a fully randomized experiment no covariate enters 0, which is constant.
However, randomization is not informative about the conditional response function esti-
mated in the second step. Therefore, a nonparametric approach based directly on equation
18(3) may be highly dimensional relative to the alternative approach suggested in this sec-
tion. Occasionally, we may want to reduce the dimensionality of the rst step estimation
by restricting some subset of the covariates in X to enter 0 parametrically. When 0 is
correctly specied in that way, the results of this section will still apply under a condi-
tional version of the assumptions, and for r equal to the number of covariates that enter 0
nonparametrically (see Hausman and Newey (1995)).
5. The Causal Interpretation of Linear Models
In econometrics, linear models are often used to describe the eect of a set of covariates
on some outcome of interest. This section briey discusses the conditions under which
traditional estimators based on linear models (OLS and 2SLS) have a causal interpreta-
tion. Since no functional form assumption is made, I will say that a linear model has a
causal interpretation if it provides a well-dened approximation to a causal relationship
of interest. I focus here on least squares approximations since the object of study will
be E[Y jD;X;D1 > D0], and expectations are easy to approximate in the L2 norm. The
term \best approximation" is used in the rest of the section meaning \best least squares
approximation" and CCRF specically refers to E[Y jD;X;D1 > D0].
The parameters of the best linear approximation to the CCRF, dened in equation (5),
have a simple form that is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1: Under Assumption 2.1, the parameters of the best linear approximation to the
















































It follows trivially that OLS has a causal interpretation when the treatment is ignorable
after conditioning on X, since in such a case we can use Z = D and  = 1. In other words,
when Z  D, then D is ignorable given X, so E[Y jD;X] describes a causal relation.
19Proposition 5.1: If Assumption 2.1 holds with Z = D then OLS provides the best linear
approximation to the CCRF.
Often the treatment cannot be assumed to be ignorable given the covariates. In such
cases, if some instrument is available to the researcher, 2SLS estimators are frequently used























Theorem 2.1, shows that the coecient of the treatment in a simple IV model without
covariates has a causal interpretation as the average treatment eect for compliers. How-
ever, this property does not generalize to 2SLS in models with covariates: 2SLS does not
estimate the best linear approximation to the CCRF. This can be easily seen by comparing
equations (12) and (13). In IV models without covariates, we use variation in D induced by
Z to explain Y , and only compliers contribute to this variation. In models with covariates,
the whole population contributes to the variation in X. So the estimands do not only
respond to the distribution of (Y;D;X) for compliers. This raises the question of how to
interpret 2SLS estimates in this setting. The rest of this section addresses this question.
For some random sample, let (b ; b ) and (b 2SLS; b 2SLS) be analog estimators of the
































































Proposition 5.2: Suppose that (
Pn
i=1 xi x0
i) is non-singular and that b  in equation (14) is
given by the OLS estimator, that is, b (xi) = x0


















Suppose also that (
Pn
i=1 xi b i x0
i) is non-singular and that
Pn
i=1(zi   x0
ib )  di 6= 0. Then,
b 2SLS = b .
20Corollary 5.1: If there exists  2 Rl such that 0(x) = x0  for almost all x in the support
of X, then 2SLS = 0.
Therefore, the coecient of the treatment indicator in 2SLS has a causal interpretation
when the 0(X) is linear in X. However, the covariate coecients (b 2SLS) do not have a
clear causal interpretation under these assumptions. The reason is that the eect of the
treatment for always-takers may dier from the eect of the treatment for compliers. Once
we subtract the eect of the treatment with 2SLS, we expect the covariate coecients to
reect the conditional distribution of Y0 given X. Although the conditional distribution
of Y0 is identied for never-takers and for compliers, this is not the case for always-takers.
On the other hand, if the eect of the treatment is constant across units, the conditional
distribution of Y0 for always-takers is also identied (as Y0 = Y1   , and  can be iden-
tied through compliers). As a result, under constant treatment eects, the conditional
distribution of Y0 given X is identied for the whole population.8 The next proposition is
a direct consequence of this fact.
Proposition 5.3: Under constant treatment eects (that is, Y1   Y0 is constant), if there
exists  2 Rl such that 0(x) = x0  for almost all x in the support of X, then 2SLS and
2SLS are given by 2SLS = Y1   Y0 and 2SLS = argmin E[fE[Y0jX]   X0g2].
The result of this proposition also holds when 0 is nonlinear as long as E[Y0jX] is linear.
Note that monotonicity is not needed here. When the eect of the treatment is constant,
the usual IV identication argument applies, and monotonicity does not play any role in
identication.
8Something similar can be said about the more general model
Y = (X) + (X)  D +  where E[jX;Z] = 0:
For this model, (X) is given by the left hand side of equation (3). However, (X) does not have a clear
causal interpretation unless the treatment eects are constant given X.
216. Empirical Application: The Effects of 401(k) Retirement
Programs on Savings
Since the early 1980s, tax-deferred retirement plans have become increasingly popular in the
US. The aim of these programs is to increase savings for retirement through tax deductibility
of the contributions to retirement accounts and tax-free accrual of interest. Taxes are paid
upon withdrawal and there are penalties for early withdrawal. The most popular tax-
deferred programs are Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans. Unlike
IRAs, 401(k) plans are provided by employers. Therefore, only workers in rms that oer
such programs are eligible. The other important dierence between IRA and 401(k) is that
employers may match some percentage of employees' 401(k) contributions.9
Whether contributions to tax-deferred retirement plans represent additional savings or
they simply crowd out other types of savings is a central issue for the evaluation of this
type of programs. This question has generated considerable research in recent years.10 The
main problem when trying to evaluate the eects of tax-deferred retirement plans on savings
is caused by individual heterogeneity. It seems likely that individuals who participate in
such programs have stronger preferences for savings, so that even in the absence of the
programs they would have saved more than those who do not participate. Therefore, simple
comparisons of personal savings between those who participate in tax-deferred retirement
plans and those who do not participate are likely to generate estimates of the eects of
tax-deferred retirement programs that are biased upwards. Even after controlling for the
eect of observed determinants of savings (such as age or income), unobserved preferences
for savings may still contaminate comparisons between participants and non-participants.
In order to overcome the individual heterogeneity problem, Poterba, Venti and Wise
(1994, 1995) used comparisons between those eligible and not eligible for 401(k) programs,
instead of comparisons between participants and non-participants. The idea is that since
401(k) eligibility is decided by employers, unobserved preferences for savings should play a
9See Employee Benet Research Institute (1997) for a detailed description of tax-deferred retirement
programs history and regulations.
10See the reviews Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) and Porteba, Venti and Wise (1996) for opposing
interpretations of the empirical evidence on this matter.
22minor role in the determination of eligibility, once we control for the eects of observables.
To support this view, Poterba, Venti and Wise present evidence that eligibles and non-
eligibles that fall in the same income brackets held similar amounts of assets at the outset
of the program in 1984. This fact suggests that, given income, 401(k) eligibility could
be unrelated to individual preferences for savings. Dierences in savings in 1991 between
eligibles and non-eligibles that fall in the same income brackets are therefore interpreted
as being caused by participation in 401(k) plans. Poterba, Venti and Wise results show
a positive eect of participation in 401(k) programs on savings. However, since not all
eligibles participate in 401(k) plans, the magnitude of such eect is left unidentied.
This section applies the methodology developed above to the study of the eects of
participation in 401(k) programs on saving behavior. As suggested by Poterba, Venti and
Wise (1994, 1995), eligibility is assumed to be ignorable given some observables (most
importantly, income) so it can be used as an instrument for participation in 401(k) pro-
grams.11 Note that since only eligible individuals can open a 401(k) account, monotonicity
holds trivially and, as explained in section 4.1, the estimators proposed here approximate
the average causal response function for the treated (i.e., for 401(k) participants).
The data consist of 9,275 observations from the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP) of 1991. These data were prepared for Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996). The
observational units are household reference persons aged 25-64 and spouse if present. The
sample is restricted to families with at least one member employed and where no member
has income from self-employment. In addition to the restrictions used in Poterba, Venti
and Wise (1996), here family income is required to fall in the $10,000-$200,000 interval.
The reason is that outside this interval, 401(k) eligibility is rare.
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the analysis sample. The treatment variable is
an indicator of participation in a 401(k) plan and the instrument is an indicator of 401(k)
eligibility. To study whether participation in 401(k) crowds out other types of saving,
net nancial assets and a binary indicator for participation in IRAs are used as outcome
11The possible exogeneity of 401(k) eligibility is the subject of an exchange between Poterba, Venti and
Wise (1995) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994).
23variables. The covariates are family income, age, marital status and family size, which
are thought to be associated with unobserved preferences for savings. Table I also reports
means and standard deviations of the variables in the sample by 401(k) participation and
401(k) eligibility status. The proportion of 401(k) eligibles in the sample is 39% and the
proportion of 401(k) participants is 28%. The proportion of eligibles who hold 401(k) ac-
counts is 70%. Relative to non-participants, 401(k) participants have larger holdings of
nancial assets and are more likely to have an IRA account. On average, 401(k) partici-
pation is associated with larger family income and a higher probability of being married.
Average age and family size are similar for participants and non-participants.
Table I allows us to compute some simple estimators that are often used when either
the treatment or the instrument can be assumed to be \as good as randomly assigned".
For example, if 401(k) participation were independent of potential outcomes, we could
use the simple comparison of means in equation (1) to estimate the average eect of the
treatment. This comparison gives $38,473 - $11,667 = $26,806 for family net nancial
assets and 0.36 - 0.21 = 0.15 for average IRA participation. Since 401(k) participation
is thought to be aected by individual preferences for savings, these simple comparisons
of means between participants and non-participants are likely to be biased upwards. If
401(k) participation was not \as good as randomly assigned" but 401(k) eligibility was a
valid instrument in absence of covariates, then we could use Theorem 2.1 to identify the
average eect of 401(k) participation on participants. Equation (2) in Theorem 2.1 suggests
a Wald estimator which gives ($30,535 - $11,677)  0.70 = $26,940 for family net nancial
assets and (0.32 - 0.21)  0.70 = 0.16 for average IRA participation. These simple IV
estimates are similar to those which use comparisons of means between participants and
non-participants. This fact suggests that, without controlling for the eect of covariates,
401(k) eligibility may not be a valid instrument. Indeed, the last two columns of Table
I show systematic dierences in the averages of the covariates between 401(k) eligibles
and non-eligibles. In fact, the comparison of averages for the covariates between eligibles
and non-eligibles gives similar numbers to that between participants and non-participants.
24Eligibles have higher average income and they are more likely to be married.
To control for these dierences, the procedure proposed in this paper estimates the
probability of 401(k) eligibility conditional on the covariates in a rst step. This rst step
is carried out here by using nonparametric series regression of 401(k) eligibility on income,
as explained in section 4.3.2. Another two covariates, age and marital status, are also
strongly associated with eligibility. To control for the eect of these discrete covariates I
adopt an approach similar to that in Hausman and Newey (1995), including in the rst
step regression 80 indicator variables that control for all the combinations of age and
marital status. Family size and interactions between covariates were excluded from the
regression since they did not seem to explain much variation in eligibility. Figure 1 shows
the estimated conditional probability of eligibility given income (with the age-marital status
variables evaluated at their means). The probability of being eligible for 401(k) is mostly
increasing with income up to $170,000 and decreasing beyond that point. Interestingly,
the conditional probability of eligibility appears to be a highly nonlinear function of family
income.
Table II reports the estimates of a linear model for the eect of 401(k) participation on
net nancial assets. In order to describe a more accurate age prole for the accumulation
of nancial assets, the age variable enters the equation quadratically. Three dierent esti-
mators are considered. The OLS estimates in column (1) show a strong positive association
between participation in 401(k) and net nancial assets given the covariates. As said above,
this association may be due not only to causality, but also to dierences in unexplained
preferences for asset accumulation. Financial assets also appear to increase rapidly with
age and income and to be lower for married couples and large families. Columns (3) and
(4) in Table II control for the endogeneity of the treatment in two dierent ways: the
conventional 2SLS estimates are shown in column (3) (with rst stage results in column
(2)), while column (4) shows the estimates for the best linear approximation to the causal
response function for the treated (which is the estimator described in equation (6)). In
both cases, the treatment coecient is attenuated but remains positive, suggesting that
25participation in 401(k) plans may increase net nancial assets. The magnitude of this eect
for the treated is estimated to be $10,800 in 1991. Note also that the coecients of the co-
variates for OLS and 2SLS are similar, but that they dier from those in column (4) which
are estimated for the treated. These dierences suggest that the conditional distribution of
net nancial assets given the covariates would still dier between 401(k) participants and
non-participants in the absence of 401(k) plans.
The positive eect of 401(k) participation on net nancial assets is not consistent with
the view that IRAs and 401(k) plans are close substitutes. To assess the degree of substi-
tution between these two types of saving plans, the rest of this section studies the eect of
401(k) participation on the probability of holding an IRA account.12
The rst three columns of Table III report the coecients of linear probability models
for IRA participation on 401(k) participation and the covariates. The OLS estimates in
column (1) show that 401(k) participation is associated with an increase of 5.7% in the
probability of holding an IRA account, once we control for the eect of the covariates in a
linear fashion. The estimated eect of 401(k) participation decreases when we instrument
this variable with 401(k) eligibility. The 2SLS estimates in column (2) show a 2.7% increase
in the probability of IRA participation due to participation in a 401(k) plan. Column (3)
uses the methodology proposed in this paper to estimate the best linear approximation
to the causal response function of participants. The eect of 401(k) participation on the
probability of holding an IRA account is further reduced and it is no longer signicant.13
Linear specications are often criticized when the dependent variable is binary. The rea-
son is that linear response functions may take values outside the [0,1] range of a conditional
probability function. Nonlinear response functions into [0,1], such as the Probit response
function, are customarily adopted for binary choice models. Columns (4) to (8) in Table III
report marginal eect coecients (partial derivatives) of a Probit response function for an
12Note that substitution between 401(k) and IRA cannot be explained only through participation in these
programs. Even if participation is constant, substitution can work through the amount of the contributions
to each program. Unfortunately, the SIPP only reports participation in IRA and not contributions.
13Inference throughout this section uses the conventional 5% level of signicance.
26indicator of having an IRA account on 401(k) participation and the covariates.14 Marginal
eects are evaluated at the mean of the covariates for the treated. Columns (4) and (5)
present the results obtained using simple Probit and Nonlinear Least Squares estimators
(i.e., treating 401(k) participation as exogenous). These results show that, after control-
ling for the eect of the covariates with a Probit specication, participation in 401(k) is
associated with an increase of 7% in the probability of holding an IRA account. However,
this association cannot be interpreted as causal, because simple Probit and Nonlinear Least
Squares estimators do not correct for endogeneity of 401(k) participation.
The Bivariate Probit model provides a simple way to deal with an endogenous binary
regressor in a dichotomous response equation. This model is based on a structural simul-
taneous equations system which completely species a joint conditional distribution for
the endogenous variables.15 The results from applying the Bivariate Probit model to the
present empirical example are contained in column (6) of Table III; they show an important
attenuation of the treatment coecient even though it remains signicant. However, the
validity of these estimates depends on the parametric assumptions on which the Bivariate
Probit model is based.
The last two columns of Table III use the techniques introduced in this paper to esti-
mate a Probit functional form for the causal response function for the treated. Column (7)
uses the Probit function as a literal specication and estimates the model by Maximum
Likelihood, as described in equation (9). The estimated eect of the treatment is smaller
than the Bivariate Probit estimate in column (6), even though it remains signicant. The
interpretation of the estimates in column (7) as the coecients of the average causal re-
sponse for the treated depends on functional form specication. However, as shown in
section 4.2.1, functional form restrictions are not necessary to identify a well-dened ap-
proximation to the causal response function of interest. Column (8) reports the estimated
14For binary indicator variables (Participation in 401(k) and Married) the table reports the change in
the response function due to a change in the indicator variable, with the covariates evaluated at the mean
for the treated.
15For the problem studied in this paper, the Bivariate Probit model species Y = 1f0D+X00 UY >
0g and D = 1f0  Z + X00   UD > 0g, where 1fAg denotes the indicator function for the event A and
the error terms UY and UD have a joint normal distribution. See Maddala (1983), p. 122 for details.
27coecients of the best least squares approximation to the average causal response for the
treated using a Probit function; this is the estimator described in equation (7). In this
case, when no parametric assumptions are made, the estimated eect of participation in
401(k) on the probability of holding an IRA account vanishes.
On the whole, Table III shows that IV methods attenuate the estimated eect of 401(k)
participation on the probability of holding an IRA account. This is consistent with the
view that estimators which do not control for endogeneity of 401(k) participation are biased
upwards. However, Table III does not oer evidence of substitutability between 401(k)
plans and IRA accounts through participation.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the simple estimates produced by using the uncondi-
tional means in Table I are much bigger than those in Tables II and III, which control for
the eect of observed covariates. The reason is that much of the heterogeneity in saving
preferences which aects our estimators can be explained by observed individual charac-
teristics. This example illustrates the important eect that conditioning on covariates may
have on causal estimates.
7. Conclusions
This paper introduces a new class of instrumental variable estimators of treatment eects
for linear and nonlinear models with covariates. The distinctive features of these estimators
are that they are based on weak nonparametric assumptions and that they provide a well-
dened approximation to a causal relationship of interest. In the context of the previous
literature on causal IV models, this paper generalizes existing identication results to situ-
ations where the ignorability of the instrument is confounded by observed covariates. This
is important because unconditionally ignorable instruments are rare in economics. The es-
timators proposed in this paper are demonstrated by using eligibility for 401(k) plans as an
instrumental variable to estimate the eect of participation in 401(k) programs on saving
behavior. The results suggest that participation in 401(k) does not crowd out savings in
nancial assets. On the contrary, participation in 401(k) seems to have a positive eect
28on nancial assets accumulation and a small or null eect on the probability of holding an
IRA account.
Some questions remain open. First, it would be interesting to generalize these re-
sults to cases with polychotomous and continuous treatments. Also, the systematic study
of the asymptotic eciency properties of the class of estimators presented in this paper
is left for future work. The least squares approximation estimators described in section
4.2.1 are probably ecient, like most other estimators based on nonparametric restric-
tions. However, results in Newey and Powell (1993) for a similar problem suggest that
two-step semiparametric estimators directly based on parametric restrictions for compliers,
like those described in section 4.2.2, may not attain the semiparametric eciency bound.
For this type of problems, asymptotically ecient estimators can be constructed as one-step
versions of an M-estimator that uses the ecient score (see Newey (1990)).
29Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1: See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Under Assumption 2.1
P(D1 > D0jX) = 1   P(D1 = D0 = 0jX)   P(D1 = D0 = 1jX)
= 1   P(D1 = D0 = 0jX;Z = 1)   P(D1 = D0 = 1jX;Z = 0)
= 1   P(D = 0jX;Z = 1)   P(D = 1jX;Z = 0)
= P(D = 1jX;Z = 1)   P(D = 1jX;Z = 0)
= E[DjX;Z = 1]   E[DjX;Z = 0]:
The rst and third equalities hold by monotonicity. The second equality holds by independence of Z. The
last two equalities hold because D is binary. By monotonicity, (D1  D0) is binary. So, the second part of
Assumption 2.1(iii) can be expressed as P(D1   D0 = 1jX) > 0 or P(D1 > D0jX) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Monotonicity implies




  E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D1 = D0 = 1]P(D1 = D0 = 1jX)
  E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D1 = D0 = 0]P(D1 = D0 = 0jX)g:
Since Z is ignorable and independent of the potential outcomes given X, and since we assume monotonicity,
the above equation can be written as




  E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 1;Z = 0]P(D = 1jX;Z = 0)
  E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 0;Z = 1]P(D = 0jX;Z = 1)g:
Consider also
E[D(1   Z)g(Y;D;X)jX] = E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 1;Z = 0]P(D = 1;Z = 0jX)
= E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 1;Z = 0]P(D = 1jX;Z = 0)P(Z = 0jX);
and
E[Z(1   D)g(Y;D;X)jX] = E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 0;Z = 1]P(D = 0;Z = 1jX)
= E[g(Y;D;X)jX;D = 0;Z = 1]P(D = 0jX;Z = 1)P(Z = 1jX):





















30Applying Bayes' theorem and integrating yields
Z

























This proves part a. of the theorem. To prove part b. note that
E[g(Y;X)(1   D)jX;D1 > D0] = E[g(Y0;X)jD = 0;X;D1 > D0]P(D = 0jX;D1 > D0)
= E[g(Y0;X)jZ = 0;X;D1 > D0]P(Z = 0jX;D1 > D0)
= E[g(Y0;X)jX;D1 > D0]P(Z = 0jX):
Where the second equality holds because for compliers D = Z. The last equality holds by independence
of Z. The proof of parts b. and c. of the theorem follows now easily. For part b., note that,



























Integration of this equation yields the desired result. The proof of part c. of the theorem is analogous to
that of part b. By construction, the theorem also holds conditioning on X. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Theorem 3.1 implies that
0 = argmin 2E [(D;Z;0(X))  g(Y;D;X;)]
and that the minimum is unique. Denote g() = g(Y;D;X;) and () = (D;Z;(X;)). By (iii) and
(v), for  close enough to 0, the absolute value of () is bounded by some constant and ()  g() is
continuous with probability one ; by (iv) this happens with probability approaching one (w.p.a.1). This,

















where e   is any compact neighborhood of 0 contained in f 2 Rl : k   0k < g for  in (iii), i() =






























+ sup 2 kE [(b )  g()]   E [(0)  g()]k: (A.2)
31The rst term of the right hand side of (A.2) is op(1) by (A.1); the second term is op(1) by (iv) and uniform
continuity of E[()  g()] on   e   compact. This result, along with (i) and (ii) and Theorem 2.1 in
Newey and McFadden (1994), implies consistency of b . Q.E.D.






























n(b    0);
where ke  0k  kb  0k and e  possibly diers between rows of @2gi()=@@0. As (b ) is bounded w.p.a.1,
then by (ii) and Lemma 4.3 in Newey and McFadden (1994), we have that n 1 Pn
i=1 i(b )(@2gi(e )=@@0)
p
!
M, which is non singular by (iv). Now, the second part of (ii) implies that w.p.a.1
p




























n(b    0)
)
:
From (ii), (iv) and H older's Inequality, it follows that E[sup2e  k(@g(0)=@)(@(0)=@0)k] < 1. So, by
using the same argument as for M, n 1 Pn
i=1(@gi(0)=@)(@(e )=@0)
p
! M. Then, by (iii) and the rst
part of (iv), b  is asymptotically linear with inuence function equal to  M
 1
 f  (@g(0)=@) + M   g,
and the result of the theorem follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: From (i) it is easy to show that n 1 Pn
i=1 k(b )@g(b )=@ (0)@g(0)=@k2 p
!
0. The results now follows from the application of the Triangle and H older's Inequalities. Q.E.D.












































By (iv), (v), (vi) and Lemma 2.4 in Newey and McFadden (1994), the second term in equation (A.3) is op(1)
and E[(0)g()] is continuous. It can be easily seen that for  close enough to 0, j() (0)j  Cj 0j
(where jj stands for the supremum norm) for some constant C. By Theorem 4 of Newey (1997), jb  0j
p
! 0.
From (vi), sup 2

n 1 Pn
i=1 (i(b )   i(0))  gi()

  C  jb    0j  n 1 Pn
i=1 b(wi) = op(1). Then, the
result follows easily from Theorem 2.1 in Newey and McFadden (1994). Q.E.D.
































b    0

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+ (xi)  (zi   0(xi))

+ op(1):



















(i(b )   i(0)) 
@2gi(e )
@@0 : (A.4)




































so the second term of equation (A.4) is op(1). Then, from (iv), b  is asymptotically linear with inuence
function  M
 1
 f  (@g(0)=@) +   (Z   0)g and the result of the theorem holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.6: Using E[sup:k 0k<k@2g()=@@0k2] < 1 and conditions of Theorem 4.5,
it is easy to show that n 1 Pn
i=1 ki(b )@gi(b )=@ i(0)@gi(0)=@k2 p
! 0. To show n 1 Pn
i=1 kb i(xi)
(zi  b (xi)) i(xi)(zi  0(xi))k2 p
! 0 an argument similar to that of the proof of Theorem 6.1 in Newey
(1994) applies. However, for the class of estimators introduced in this paper we have that kD(W;e ;;) 
D(W;e ;0;0)k  C  k@2g(e )=@@0k  k   0k  je j for  close enough to 0, e  2 G (where G is the set of
all square-integrable functions of X) and ke  0k  k 0k. The fact that there is a function dominating
kD(W;e ;;)   D(W;e ;0;0)k that does not depend on j   0j allows us to specify conditions on the
rate of growth of K that are weaker than those in Assumption 6.7 of Newey (1994b). These conditions are
implied by the assumptions of Theorem 4.5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: It follows directly from the rst order conditions (under exchangeability of deriva-
tive and integral) and convexity of E[(Y  (D+X0))2] = P(D1 > D0)E[(Y  (D+X0))2jD1 > D0].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: It derives directly from Lemma 5.1 and Z = D. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: It can be easily seen that b i  (di   x0
i b ) = (zi   x0




xi (zi   x0
i b ) =
n X
i=0







xi b i xi0
! 1 n X
i=1
xi b i di:




di b i yi)   (
P
di b i x0
i)(
P




xi b i yi)
(
P
di b i di)   (
P
di b i x0
i)(
P








i b )b i yi P
(di   x0









Proof of Corollary 5.1: It follows from Proposition 5.2 and a Weak Law of Large Numbers for the
estimators in equations (14) and (15). Q.E.D.
33Proof of Proposition 5.3: Consider (0;0) given in the proposition, that is 0 = Y1   Y0 and
0 = argmin  E[(Y0   X0)2]. Let us show that the orthogonality conditions of 2SLS hold for (0;0).
Note that
Y   0D   X00 = Y0 + (Y1   Y0   0)  D   X00 = Y0   X00:
Then,
E [Z  (Y   0D   X00)] = E [Z  (Y0   X00)] = 0E [X  (Y0   X00)] = 0
and,
E [X  (Y   0D   X00)] = E [X  (Y0   X00)] = 0:
So, the result of the proposition holds. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Conditional Probability of Eligibility for 401(k) Plan given Income
37Table I
Means and Standard Deviations
By 401(k) participation By 401(k) eligibility
Entire
Sample Participants Non-participants Eligibles Non-eligibles
Treatment:
Participation in 401(k) 0.28 0.70 0.00
(0.45) (0.46) (0.00)
Instrument:
Eligibility for 401(k) 0.39 1.00 0.16
(0.49) (0.00) (0.37)
Outcome variables:
Family Net Financial Assets 19,071.68 38,472.96 11,667.22 30,535.09 11,676.77
(63,963.84) (79,271.08) (55,289.23) (75,018.98) (54,420.17)
Participation in IRA 0.25 0.36 0.21 0.32 0.21
(0.44) (0.48) (0.41) (0.47) (0.41)
Covariates:
Family Income 39,254.64 49,815.14 35,224.25 47,297.81 34,066.10
(24,090.00) (26,814.24) (21,649.17) (25,620.00) (21,510.64)
Age 41.08 41.51 40.91 41.48 40.82
(10.30) (9.65) (10.53) (9.61) (10.72)
Married 0.63 0.70 0.60 0.68 0.60
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
Family Size 2.89 2.92 2.87 2.91 2.87
(1.53) (1.47) (1.55) (1.48) (1.56)
Note: The sample includes 9,275 observations from the SIPP of 1991. The observational units are household reference persons aged
25-64, and spouse if present, with Family Income in the $10,000-$200,000 interval. Other sample restrictions are the same as in Poterba,
Venti and Wise (1995).
3
8Table II
Linear Response Functions for Family Net Financial Assets
Dependent Variable: Family Net Financial Assets (in $)
Endogenous Treatment
Two Stage Least Squares
Ordinary Least Squares
Least Squares First Stage Second Stage Treated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participation in 401(k) 13,527.05 9,418.83 10,800.25
(1,810.27) (2,152.89) (2,261.55)
Constant -23,549.00 -0.0306 -23,298.74 -27,133.56
(2,178.08) (0.0087) (2,167.39) (3,212.35)
Family Income (in thousand $) 976.93 0.0013 997.19 982.37
(83.37) (0.0001) (83.86) (106.65)
Age (minus 25) -376.17 -0.0022 -345.95 312.30
(236.98) (0.0010) (238.10) (371.76)
Age (minus 25) square 38.70 0.0001 37.85 24.44
(7.67) (0.0000) (7.70) (11.40)
Married -8,369.47 -0.0005 -8,355.87 -6,646.69
(1,829.93) (0.0079) (1,829.67) (2,742.77)
Family Size -785.65 0.0001 -818.96 -1,234.25
(410.78) (0.0024) (410.54) (647.42)
Eligibility for 401(k) 0.6883
(0.0080)
Note: The dependent variable in column (2) is Participation in 401(k). The sample includes 9,275 observations
from the SIPP of 1991. The observational units are household reference persons aged 25-64, and spouse if present,
with Family Income in the $10,000-$200,000 interval. Other sample restrictions are the same as in Poterba, Venti
and Wise (1995). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
3
9Table III
Linear and Probit Response Functions for IRA Participation
Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable: IRA Account
Linear Response Probit Response
Endogenous Treatment Endogenous Treatment
Least Sq. Two Stage Least Sq. Probit Least Sq. Bivariate Probit Least Sq.
Least Sq. Treated Probit Treated Treated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Participation 0.0569 0.0274 0.0253 0.0712 0.0699 0.0407 0.0358 0.0264
in 401(k) (0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0172)
Family Income 0.0059 0.0060 0.0060 0.0069 0.0070 0.0069 0.0069 0.0072
(in thousand $) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Age (minus 25) 0.0074 0.0076 0.0119 0.0149 0.0153 0.0147 0.0183 0.0207
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0037)
Age (minus 25) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
square (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married 0.0312 0.0313 0.0440 0.0590 0.0477 0.0577 0.0627 0.0535
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0184) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0148) (0.0231) (0.0244)
Family Size -0.0264 -0.0266 -0.0340 -0.0424 -0.0403 -0.0415 -0.0472 -0.0480
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0075) (0.0082)
Note: For binary indicator variables (Participation in 401(k) and Married) the table reports the change in the response function due to a
change in the indicator variable, with the rest of the covariates evaluated at the mean for the treated. For non-binary variables the table
reports partial derivatives evaluated at the mean of the covariates for the treated. The sample includes 9,275 observations from the SIPP of
1991. The observational units are household reference persons aged 25-64, and spouse if present, with Family Income in the $10,000-$200,000
interval. Other sample restrictions are the same as in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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